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Abstract: 
Over the past few years, Chinese viewers have regularly mocked a popular genre of 
television dramas for overly heroic portrayals of the War of Resistance Against Japan. 
Charging the dramas with distorting history, the viewers nicknamed them ‘Mythic 
Plays’ and instigated a national discussion on the dramas’ representation of the war. 
This article analyzes the public controversy about Mythic Plays through a Critical 
Discourse Analysis of online comments. It examines viewers’ expectation of televisual 
representation of Chinese history and perception of their own position in the cultural 
ecology. On the one hand, this article proposes a revision to Hall’s encoding/decoding 
model. It points out that audience resistance to a text should not automatically be 
equated with resistance to dominant ideology, since the resistance can be the 
consequence of the producer-audience conflict over how certain ideological 
meanings, rather than which ideological meanings, are encoded into the text. 
Meanwhile, the meanings perceived and opposed by the audience may not be the 
meanings intended by producers, due to the polysemic nature of the text. On the 
other hand, this article reveals that in addition to actively interpreting texts, audience 
members also interpret the power relations between text producers, regulators, and 
themselves. We call upon audience researchers to include thorough analysis of the 
audience’s perception of these existing power relations. 
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Introduction 
In the past decade, conflict between China and Japan has intensified over (among other 
issues) the ownership of the island in the East China known as Diaoyu by the Chinese and 
Senkaku by the Japanese. Chinese nationalist sentiments have surged partly as a result of 
these conflicts. This has contributed to an expanding market for television dramas about the 
War of Resistance Against Japan (WRAJ), which was fought from 1937 to 1945. Viewed as a 
safe and profitable genre that aligns with nationalist themes favored by the censorship 
bureau, these dramas have attracted steady economic investment. However, many viewers 
took to the internet to mock some of these resisting-Japan dramas (抗日剧) for being 
unrealistic and full of anachronisms, nicknaming them Mythic Plays (抗日神剧). Indeed, the 
dramas show Chinese martial-arts warriors defeating Japanese soldiers using hand-to-hand 
combat against modern weaponry. In a well-known scene, a female archer, dressed in 
incongruously modern clothes, kills several Japanese soldiers at once with one shot of her 
bow shortly after being raped. Although derided by viewers and critics, Mythic Plays have 
drawn large audiences. Legendary Warriors (抗日奇侠), one of the most famous Mythic 
Plays, became a ratings winner. Reruns were sold for about $300,000 each (Liu, 2013). 
In 2013, when the production of resisting-Japan dramas peaked, they became the 
subject of a national debate. As the nickname Mythic Plays gained popularity online, 
authoritative state media began to pay attention, taking a patriotic stance against the 
unorthodox representation of the war. An anchor for China Central Television (CCTV) sternly 
commented: ‘The War of Resistance Against Japan was a very painful experience in our 
national history. Therefore, it should not be interpreted playfully’ (CCTV, 2013). The 
Communist Party’s newspaper People’s Daily also criticized Mythic Plays: 
 
We won the war with huge sacrifice, and this should be our basic cognition 
when evaluating history… Nowadays, resisting-Japan dramas have abandoned 
their duty of propaganda and education, totally becoming entertainment 
products. This change is logically understandable. But the ‘self-liberation’ of 
the drama producers is so radical that even the basic cognition has been 
ignored… (Dong, 2013). 
 
As a result of the controversy, the censorship bureau, then called the State Administration 
of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), required that dramas about the 
WRAJ be reviewed again, announcing that those focusing too strongly on entertainment 
should be modified or even banned. An official from the censorship bureau declared that 
certain dramas showed no respect for history and exerted a negative effect on society 
(Watts, 2013). The official’s statement seemed to disregard the fact that it was the viewers 
who first resisted the Mythic Plays, and for the very same reasons. This official was not 
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alone. China’s media elites, in keeping with the ideology of the vanguard of the people, also 
ignored the fact that it was viewers who initiated the negative discussions about Mythic 
Plays, in support of patriotism and responsibility. Among many media outlets, CCTV in fact 
suggested that the production of Mythic Plays could be explained by viewers’ yearning for 
amusement (CCTV, 2013). The censorship bureau’s intervention, as well as the state media’s 
condemnation, did not resolve the issue. Mythic Plays continued to trigger heated 
discussions. In 2015, a drama called Fight Against the Devils Together (一起打鬼子) became 
controversial for a sexually suggestive plotline and was banned (Wang, 2015). 
In this article we explore viewers’ ideological position in their active online 
discussions on Mythic Plays, as well as the theoretical implications of these online 
discussions for audience research. Our conceptual approach adopts Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model and its later development, which addresses ideology in media 
consumption. Then we locate the ideological position of the producers of Mythic Plays 
through prior studies on television production in China and the literature on the dominant 
ideology in China: patriotism. Subsequently we explicate our methods and analyze the 
online discourse. We identity three main themes as characterizing the discourse and 
revealing the dominant-hegemonic position taken by viewers. We argue that online 
commenters embodied the hegemonic viewpoints of Chinese patriotism despite their 
resistance to the dramas. Our analysis leads us to draw two conclusions. First, audience 
resistance to media texts should never be unreflectively equated with resistance to the 
dominant ideology, since the resistance can be the consequence of the producer-audience 
conflict over how certain ideological meanings, rather than which ideological meanings, are 
encoded into the text. Meanwhile, the meanings perceived and opposed by the audience 
may not be the meanings intended by producers, due to the polysemic nature of the text. 
Second, in addition to actively interpreting texts, audience members also interpret the 
power relations among text producers, regulators, and themselves. We recommend that 
future research take the audience’s perception of these relations more fully into account. 
 
The encoding/decoding model revisited 
The rise of new media has allowed for a reshaping of the role of the audience, affording 
audiences participation that is more active and counteracting linear accounts of media 
influence, which imagine the process as starting with the media institution and ending at 
the audience (Livingstone, 2015). The concept of the ‘active audience’ has been 
rejuvenated. The audience can now interact with the content by sharing videos, creating 
remixes, and commenting (Agirre, Arrizabalaga, & Espilla, 2016). Through a second-screen 
device (e.g., tablet, smartphone), viewers can chat with their co-viewers about content in 
real time (Guo & Chan-Olmsted, 2015; J. Lee & Choi, 2017). The aggregations of the 
audience online can draw attention from professional media producers, influence the media 
agenda, and affect the visibility of certain media content (Jiang & Huang, 2017; Malmelin & 
Villi, 2016; Singer, 2014). Assuming a more visible role, the audience has become more 
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active in ‘the circuit of culture’ (Livingstone, 2015, p. 442). Accordingly, the focus of active 
audience research seems to have shifted to the interactive forms of consumption practices 
online and away from ideologies and meaning making, which were discussed in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The discussions on meaning making examined the audience’s positions in 
relation to the dominant ideology (e.g., Fiske, 1986; Hall, 1980; Morley, 1993; Newcomb & 
Hirsch, 1983). With this shift in audience research, the critical perspective on ideology has 
been more or less shelved. 
Nevertheless, the nationalist sentiments reflected in the online discussions on 
Mythic Plays remind us that a critical perspective on ideology is still relevant to audience 
research. To adopt such a perspective, we revisit Hall’s encoding/decoding model, which 
inspired the discussions in the 1980s and 1990s, and review its subsequent development. 
Hall (1980) uses the concept of ‘code’ to refer to the correspondence between signs, visual 
or linguistic, and ideological meanings. As he argues, codes ‘contract relations for the sign 
with the wider universe of ideologies in a society’ (Hall, 1980, p. 134). He frames media 
production, with TV news being his example, as a process of encoding, and media 
consumption as decoding. The professional broadcasters encode into content the 
hegemonic viewpoints that serve the current social order. However, viewers do not 
necessarily decode the message in the way intended by broadcasters. According to Hall, 
viewers may adopt three positions in relation to the hegemonic viewpoints encoded into 
the text: (1) the dominant-hegemonic position, where viewers decode the message the way 
it is encoded; (2) the negotiated position, where viewers accept the hegemonic viewpoint at 
a general level, but seek particular exceptions with regard to their own situations and 
thoughts; (3) the oppositional position, where viewers understand the intent of the 
encoders but decode the message in a contrary way (Hall, 1980). 
This encoding/decoding model has left its proponents with three main problems to 
solve. The first problem concerns polysemy. The three positions of decoding proposed by 
Hall are based on the audience’s conscious awareness of the intended meanings encoded 
into the text. In other words, these positions – agreement, negotiation, opposition – are in 
relation to the intended meaning. However, polysemy means that the audience may create 
new meanings out of the text. The audience’s perceived meanings may not be intended by 
the producers. Therefore, ‘polysemy’ and ‘opposition’ should be seen as two analytically 
distinct processes, although they do interconnect in the overall reading process (Morley, 
2006; Schrøder, 2000). The second problem relates to aesthetics. Researchers have noted 
that TV viewers may take an aesthetically critical stance towards the text, commenting on 
the paradigmatic and syntagmatic aspects of textual production (Michelle, 2007; Schrøder, 
2000). Underlying this is the viewers’ awareness of the ‘constructedness’ of the text, which 
is a different dimension from meaning making in the decoding process. The third problem 
addresses the positions of encoding. Hall’s model does not differentiate the various 
positions media producers may take in relation to the dominant ideology. Instead, it 
assumes that encoding always takes place within a dominant-hegemonic position (Ross, 
2011).  
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There have been attempts to develop Hall’s model and solve the problems 
mentioned above. Schrøder (2000) focuses on the audience reception process, breaking it 
down into six dimensions: motivation, comprehension, (aesthetic) discrimination, position 
(in relation to the text), (political) evaluation, and implementation. Schrøder’s model aims 
to address polysemy and the audience’s awareness of ‘constructedness’ by addressing 
comprehension and discrimination. The division between position and evaluation also draws 
attention to the difference between readers’ attitudes towards the text and their positions 
in relation to dominant ideology, given that the text does not necessarily takes a dominant-
hegemonic stance. Nevertheless, this model does not explain how these six dimensions 
interconnect and contribute to viewers’ ideological position in their overall reading process. 
Another attempt is Michelle’s (2007) multi-dimensional model of modes of audience 
reception. Michelle differentiates between four modes of audience reception: (1) 
transparent mode: viewers are absorbed and engulfed by media texts, as they read the text 
as life; (2) referential mode: viewers perceive the text as like life, making comparisons and 
analogies between depicted reality and their own knowledge and experience; (3) mediated 
mode: viewers recognize the constructed nature of the text as a media production; (4) 
discursive mode: viewers perceive the text as a message and respond to its ideological 
connotations. Above these four modes lies viewers’ evaluation of the text, which reveals 
their positions in relation to hegemonic discourses. Like Schrøder’s model, this model leaves 
out the encoding process and therefore is rather one-sided. It fails to address how encoding 
itself, or how media producers’ use of certain signs to convey meanings, may bring 
complexity to the possible readings of the audience. 
In contrast, Ross (2011) addresses the variety of encoding positions. He maintains 
that there can be three positions in relation to the dominant ideology in the encoding 
process as well: dominant-hegemonic position, negotiated position, and oppositional 
position. He further differentiates between the acceptance of the text and the acceptance 
of the dominant ideology, as can be seen in his text-relative encoding/decoding typology 
(Figure 1). Despite its strength in providing a more nuanced understanding of the encoding 
process, this typology does not clearly reflect the dimensions of polysemy and the 
audience’s awareness of the ‘constructedness’ of the text. Besides, it does not address the 
difference between the code adopted by media producers, or the ‘professional code’ as Hall 
calls it (1980, p. 136), and the audience code. This difference entails that the same signs may 
have different connotations for producers and viewers. Additionally, each of these two 
parties is not monolithic and could be internally divided according to the codes. We argue 
that it is exactly the difference in codes that generates polysemy. To better elaborate this in 
our analysis, we conceptualize the adoption of certain codes by producers and viewers 
respectively as encoding strategies and decoding strategies. For producers, encoding 
strategies are partly influenced by their imagination of how the audience will decode their 
products (Matthews, 2007, 2008), which we conceptualize as the imagined decoding 
strategies. For viewers, their awareness of the ‘constructedness’ of the text means that 
from the text they also perceive, apart from its meaning, the encoding strategies, which are 
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not necessarily the same strategies adopted by producers. These perceived encoding 
strategies constitute an important dimension of the decoding process. 
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Figure 1: The text-relative version of the modified encoding/decoding typology proposed by 
Ross. Reprinted with permission from ‘The encoding/decoding model revisited’, by S. Ross 
(2011, p. 8). 
 
In light of the above, we propose a revision to the encoding/decoding model (Figure 2). 
Based on their intended meanings and imagined decoding strategies, media producers 
execute certain encoding strategies and give a certain shape to the text. In the decoding 
process, viewers derive both perceived meanings and perceived encoding strategies from 
the text. From these two dimensions, viewers arrive at their evaluation of the text. This 
revised model admits the diversity of producers’ ideological positions in the encoding 
process. Clearly separating perceived meanings from intended meanings, it anticipates the 
situation of polysemy. By distinguishing between perceived meanings and perceived 
encoding strategies, it also gives space to audience’s awareness of the ‘constructedness’ of 
the text.  
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Figure 2: A revision of the encoding/decoding model. 
 
This revised model enables us to capture the nuanced dynamics between media producers 
and viewers in the case of Mythic Plays. In our analysis, we first tackle the question that we 
are most interested in: what ideological position was taken by the Chinese viewers who 
resisted Mythic Plays? Then we discuss how both the perceived meanings and the perceived 
encoding strategies are entangled in these online discussions, and how viewers helped 
reproduce the power relations in the Chinese media ecology. To better understand what the 
viewers exactly resisted in the case of Mythic Plays, we first locate the ideological position 
of the producers of Mythic Plays by reviewing the literature on television production and 
the dominant ideology in China: patriotism.  
 
Ideological position of producers 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been able to effectively control the production of 
media content, even after the introduction of the market-oriented reforms in the 1990s (Xu, 
2015; Zhao, 2008). Many studies have shown that the commercial reform does not 
necessarily undermine the party’s control over the media system and the content’s 
ideological stance (Fung, 2008; Lee, He, & Huang, 2006; Ma, 2000; Zhao, 2000). In the 
Chinese television industry, content producers face strict and sometimes unpredictable 
censorship, as well as the risk of high financial costs resulting from failure to pass the 
censorship procedure (Xu, 2015; Zhao, 2008). To survive, they comply with the party-state’s 
ideological guidelines rather than challenge them, thus participating in the maintenance of 
the ideological hegemony of the CCP (Bai, 2012; Xu, 2013, 2015; Zhao, 2008; Zhao & Guo, 
2005). Therefore, there can be no doubt that TV content producers, especially the 
producers of mainstream genres, take the dominant-hegemonic encoding position (Cai, 
2016a, 2016b). However, they also need to win over Chinese viewers, who are no longer 
satisfied with consuming overt, ‘heavy’ propaganda. Viewers prefer commercial-style TV 
programs (Xu, 2015; Zhao, 2008). The problem for producers is how to encode the dominant 
ideological viewpoints into the content in a way that is accepted by both the censors and 
the audience. 
Producers of Mythic Plays face this dilemma. On the one hand, they can by no means 
choose an alternative to the dominant-hegemonic encoding position, especially given the 
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specific subject matter they are dealing with. The WRAJ is an important reference point of 
Chinese patriotism, an officially promoted form of nationalism, which constitutes the 
ideological foundation of the CCP’s legitimacy after the withering away of communist 
ideology (Cao, 2005; Wang, 2008; Zhao, 1998; Zheng, 1999). Since the 1980s, the state has 
been trying to intensify people’s love for the nation and exhort people to identify with the 
party-state, which claims to be the guardian of the nation (He, 2007; Zheng, 1999). The 
official discourse never separates love for the nation from love for the CCP (Fairbrother, 
2003). Meanwhile, history education on China’s resistance against foreign aggression has 
become a key aspect of the patriotic propaganda project (He, 2007). The Maoist ‘victor 
narrative’, which highlights the people’s triumph over the feudal Qing Dynasty and western 
imperialism while leaving out the painful details of wars, has been replaced by a 
‘victimization narrative’ that emphasizes national humiliation and blames ‘the West’, 
including Japan, for China’s woes (Callahan, 2006; Gries, 2004). Accordingly, narratives 
about the WRAJ assume an indispensable role in the patriotic propaganda and therefore are 
closely scrutinized. Producers of Mythic Plays are only allowed to take the dominant-
hegemonic encoding position. 
On the other hand, the producers need to make their products attractive to viewers. 
Without changing the fundamental ideological message of patriotism, they need to tell 
appealing stories and create interesting characters. In that sense, their efforts are not made 
at the level of the ideological message, but the level of representation, or as we articulate, 
encoding strategies. These encoding strategies are partially based on the producers’ 
imagination of the audience’s taste, or the imagined decoding strategies. In Mythic Plays, 
the most prominent encoding strategy seems to be the commercial-style mixture of various 
elements of different television genres, such as romance, Kung Fu, comedy, and so on (Li, 
2015). These elements seem to be the most controversial part according to the online 
discussion, making many Chinese viewers conclude that Mythic Plays are ‘overly 
entertaining’ and disrespecting of their country’s history.  
 
Methodology 
In this article we employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine viewers’ online 
comments. CDA concentrates on questions concerning the relationship between discourse 
and ideology (Fairclough, 1992; Van Dijk, 1993). CDA may pay more attention to ‘top-down 
relations of dominance than to bottom-up relations of resistance, compliance and 
acceptance’, and prefer to focus on elites and their discursive strategies (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 
250). Yet, we focus on the discourse of media consumers. We understand that analyzing the 
discourse of political elites and producers in the cultural industries could reveal how 
ideological propositions are disguised to appear natural, for the benefit of privileged groups. 
But we believe that by analyzing ordinary people’s discourse we can contribute to 
knowledge of the complexity and interactivity in ideological articulation. Among the many 
aspects CDA examines, we focus on ‘foregrounding/backgrounding’ and ‘presupposition’ 
(Huckin, 1997) to see what Chinese viewers emphasize and take for granted when discussing 
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Mythic Plays. 
We collected comments from Baidu Tieba, China’s most popular bulletin board, and 
from Weibo, reported to host almost 70% of the 204 million Chinese microbloggers (China 
Internet Network, 2015). We also examined 87 comments on Fight Against the Devils 
Together, which was the most heavily discussed Mythic Play during the period of our data 
collection, on the review site Douban. Our data collection began on August 21, 2015. We 
started with Baidu Tieba, where we located the most popular post about Mythic Plays, 
which on October 13, 2016, had 7,550 comments,1 as well as other posts with lots of 
comments. On September 2, 2015, we searched for ‘Mythic Plays’ on Weibo. We examined 
the first 1,000 search results, which were the ones most recently posted. Among these 
1,000 results, some posts were comments on Mythic Plays themselves. Others were 
comments on a temporary ban on entertainment television programs issued by the 
SAPPRFT which, however, let resisting-Japan dramas pass. Although we did not expect the 
comments on the ban, they also helped us understand the discussions about Mythic Plays. 
Therefore, we analyzed these comments and discuss them in a separate section. After data 
collection, from September 2015 through March 2016 we made note of online posts about 
Mythic Plays. To systematically analyze the large amount of online comments, we first 
coded our data in an iterative way through constant comparisons (Hallberg, 2006). After 
reaching thematic saturation, we recorded major themes that emerged from the online 
comments. We then analyzed the tenets of patriotism encompassed in each theme and the 
discursive strategies used to naturalize these tenets. Following accepted procedures for a 
CDA analysis, we aim to demonstrate how hegemonic discourse was reproduced in the 
discussions on Mythic Plays. This means, among other things, that we do not make strong 
claims about the representativeness of the comments and opinions we highlight, but we do 
propose that comments in defense of hegemony were a clearly recognizable feature of the 
online utterances we examined. As Tonkiss notes:  
 
As the primary interest which the discourse analyst has in personal accounts is 
not so much the views being expressed, but how different views are 
established and warranted, questions of representativeness are not so crucial. 
[…] As a discourse analyst […] you are not necessarily aiming to give a 
representative overview of public attitudes towards immigration, for instance, 
but seeking to examine how particular attitudes are shaped, reproduced and 
legitimized through the use of language. (Tonkiss, 1998, p. 253) 
 
It is no secret that the Chinese authorities employ online commenters, known as the fifty-
cent party, to guide public opinion. According to the official press releases about the 
training for official online commenters (e.g. Chen, 2014; Gu, 2015; Huang, 2014; Pang, 
2013), as well as a study based on emails leaked from the Internet Propaganda Office of a 
local government (King, Pan & Robert, 2017), it appears that the fifty-cent party mainly 
influences debates on emerging social events in which the state or certain government 
Volume 16, Issue 1 
                                        May 2019 
 
Page 116 
 
agencies may be targeted, or on events that could cause social instability and the rise of 
collective movements. The fifty-cent party’s strategy seems to be cheerleading for the CCP 
and distracting the public by changing the subject, rather than engaging in argument (King 
et al., 2017). Based on the existing research, then, it seems that the fifty-cent party was 
unlikely to be involved in the discussions about Mythic Plays. Nevertheless, even if it was 
involved, the comments of the fifty-cent party members should not be regarded as 
contaminant or foreign matter among the assumed genuine comments of viewers. We 
doubt if it is reasonable to draw a definite boundary between fifty-cent party members and 
ordinary viewers. The assumed genuine viewers actually consist of people from different 
social groups, including those whose perspective may not be so different from the fifty-cent 
party members, such as civil servants and party members of the CCP. Moreover, viewers by 
no means inhabit a pure and isolated environment where they form their opinions 
independently. In fact, their opinions are frequently the results of the constant shaping by 
the voices of different parties in the society, including the propagandist voice. If the fifty-
cent party members were involved, their job would be amplifying the propagandist voices 
that already existed, rather than creating new voices. If there was significant schism 
between viewers’ comments and the propagandist voice, we are confident we would have 
noticed this in our analysis. Therefore, we argue that the possible involvement of the fifty-
cent party would not constitute a major concern for our analysis.  
 
The online discourse on Mythic Plays 
From the online discourse we extracted three themes, which we discuss in detail below. It 
should be noted that sometimes two or all three themes can be detected in one single 
comment. The themes interconnect and together constitute the discursive formation of 
Chinese patriotism regarding television production.  
 
Mythic Plays distort history and mislead viewers 
All historical dramas contain at least some factual flaws, distortion or implausibility. It might 
well depend in part on their quantity and the overall quality of a show whether and how 
strongly viewers take offense. In the case of Mythic Plays commenters pointed to perceived 
factual inaccuracies. Some remarked upon the weapons used, for instance: ‘This type of gun 
belongs to the United States Marine Corps in the 1970s’2 (Tieba.baidu.com, Mar 8, 2015). 
Such comments presuppose that resisting-Japan dramas should be consistent with ‘the 
facts’. They naturalize the importance of factual accuracy, and promote the search for 
additional factual inaccuracies, thereby creating a vicious circle. Concerns centered not just 
on mere factual issues. Mythic Plays were blamed for creating a false impression of the war: 
 
Nowadays Mythic Plays have seriously affected compatriots’ knowledge of 
history. My aunt is 83 years old, and she told me that the Japanese didn’t kill 
everyone they met, at least in the north of Henan province. The Japanese 
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always came to the village to catch chickens and pigs. In 1942 Henan province 
suffered a great famine. Once she was delivering a meal to her father and saw 
lots of dying people lying on the ground. I suggest facing up to the history and 
making fewer Mythic Plays. (Weibo.com, Mar 14, 2015)   
 
We observed the third-person effect when viewers wrote about the threat Mythic Plays 
supposedly pose to people’s understanding of history (Davison, 1983). Viewers tended to 
worry about the influence Mythic Plays might have on others, especially the young. One 
viewer wrote: ‘Stop making Mythic Plays. You guys can only [negatively] affect children’s 
knowledge of history and spoil the fruit of victory’ (Weibo.com, Apr 8, 2015). Another 
comment read: ‘It is irresponsible to history that some Mythic Plays producers transform 
the tragic resisting-Japan history into ridiculous comedies. It will affect teenagers’ cognition 
of the war’ (Weibo.com, Jul 12, 2015). 
 Viewers thus constructed an unequal relation between themselves and others. 
Underlying their discourse was a sense of superiority. Viewers did not regard others as 
smart, nor did they recall that they once were teenagers, too. Their self-identity as a 
guardian and their impulse to protect others from the harm Mythic Plays supposedly cause 
revealed their paternalism. They doubted that others can self-govern and thereby endorsed 
a rationale for censorship. 
 
History constructs China’s national identity 
Viewers not only complained that Mythic Plays distort the historical record. The history of 
the war against Japan was foregrounded as a central component of China’s national 
identity. Viewers thereby pronounced it something close to, if not actually, sacred. In other 
words, Mythic Plays were condemned not just for misrepresenting but even disrespecting 
the history of the war and therefore the Chinese nation. Some commenters posited that 
Mythic Plays disrespected history by the way they depict Chinese and Japanese soldiers: 
 
I feel speechless about the Mythic Plays that keep popping up recently. They 
distort history and exaggerate [China’s] combat power to satisfy the rising 
national vanity and heroism… Compared with the real battles, battle scenes in 
those dramas are nothing. [Scriptwriters are] a flock of literary pigs that have 
never experienced war. They know nothing about war. It is extremely 
disrespectful to the resisting-Japan martyrs who fought bloody battles! 
(Weibo.com, Sep 2, 2015) 
 
By presenting images of unbeatable Chinese and weak Japanese soldiers, Mythic Plays 
contradict the official victimization narrative that the Chinese encounter in textbooks and 
the media. A victory against the Japanese that is not depicted as hard-won threatens a key 
component of their national pride. Other viewers argued that the disrespect derives from 
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treating the history of the war without the seriousness it deserves or even commands. They 
chided Mythic Plays for being primarily infotainment: 
 
China always condemns the Japanese government for disrespecting the 
history, but do we respect the history? The fudged Mythic Plays are 
entertainizing [sic] and consuming the history, and they are amusing and 
playing with the audience, showing no respect at all for the resisting-Japan 
heroes. We [Chinese] do not [get to] see the discrepancy in military power 
between the two countries at the time. (Weibo.com, Aug 15, 2015) 
 
Viewers thus foregrounded ‘history’ and ‘seriousness’ at the expense of ‘entertainment’. By 
insisting on the sacred nature of the history of the war against Japan, viewers upheld the 
authority of the official history. They constructed a hierarchical relation between the 
dramas and official history, in favor of the latter, rather than applying different sets of 
criteria for dramas, including Mythic Plays, on the one hand, and non-fiction fare on the 
other. Official history was seen as the suzerain and the television dramas as tributaries, with 
the latter having to pay tribute (‘respect’) to the former. In short, viewers supported the 
existing media ecology in which regulators impose ideological functions on cultural 
products.  
 
Directors and scriptwriters should be reined in 
Directors and scriptwriters were blamed for the historical inaccuracies and sensationalism of 
Mythic Plays. One viewer wrote: 
 
I want to say to the Chinese directors that it’s enough. Why cannot [the 
dramas] correspond to the real history? It’s mental masturbation and you are 
making up historical stories. Chinese TV dramas have been disgraced! […] You 
directors who make resisting-Japan [dramas] into science-fiction dramas 
should feel shame! (Tieba.baidu.com, Jan 17, 2015) 
 
Another viewer added: 
 
Mythic Plays absolutely insult the sacrificed resisting-Japan martyrs and 
underestimate the audience’s IQ. They only pursue entertainment and totally 
ignore the hardness of the resistance war, and that’s a big irony. Those 
directors’ heads are filled with shit. (Tieba.baidu.com, Apr 2, 2015) 
 
Viewers supposed that the low quality of Mythic Plays was due simply to a lack of personal 
ability on the part of their creators without mentioning that producers and writers are 
limited by the political and economic context in which they operate. Some viewers 
emphasized that a number of the directors originated from Hong Kong or Taiwan, thereby 
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absolving mainland directors from blame. One said: ‘Most directors of Mythic Plays are from 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. […] They scapegoated mainland directors. Didn’t you detect the 
strong Kong-Tai (Hong Kong and Taiwan) flavor [in Mythic Plays]?’ (Tieba.baidu.com, Apr 8, 
2015). Such comments set up the non-mainland directors as scapegoats, as the ‘internal 
other’ in the Chinese world, to relieve the tension Mythic Plays were felt to exert on 
viewers’ national identity and ‘Chineseness’. 
Some viewers called for stricter censorship: 
 
I request the SAPPRFT to ban the Mythic Plays that have been broadcast over 
and over again on TV. One arrow can kill a dozen [Japanese] devils, and one 
warrior can kill the devil bare-handed. [Those dramas] could seriously mislead 
not only teenagers but also middle-aged and elderly people. (Weibo.com, Apr 
22, 2014) 
 
Another comment read: 
 
Mythic Plays mislead the compatriots. If it was so easy to defeat the Japanese 
devils, why did it cost eight years?3 Why so much blood and so many 
sacrifices? Why was an enormous amount of Chinese land burnt? Why has 
Japan always refused to apologize after the war and push the people all over 
the world to the limit? Could the truth be stuck to? Could the scriptwriters 
and directors have a basic sense of responsibility and conscience? The 
censorship officials only know to ban foreign dramas. Why are they absent 
when it comes to Mythic Plays? (Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015)  
 
In short, viewers defended the authority of the official history and called for a strengthening 
of the regulation of the dramas. They regarded the censorship bureau to have committed a 
dereliction of duty by not regulating Mythic Plays strictly enough. With their criticism 
viewers constructed a superior position over the censors, thereby inversing the real-life 
power relation between them. By calling the censors inefficient, viewers took the vantage 
point of a disappointed supervisor of supervisors. Instead of questioning the need for 
censors, viewers chose to provide them with guidance.4 
 
Code-generated conflicts 
Our analysis shows that the viewers who employed the above discourse in the discussions 
on Mythic Plays took the dominant-hegemonic position in relation to Chinese patriotism. 
That means the case of Mythic Plays presents us with a situation where producers and 
viewers may take the same ideological position but still clash over the text. In this situation, 
conflicts between producers and viewers are over their codes rather than their ideological 
positions. In fact, Hall (1980) long ago noted the possible conflicts between the codes of 
different groups – in his case, the professional code of TV producers and the dominant code 
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of ruling elites. As he argues: ‘Of course, conflicts, contradictions and even 
misunderstandings regularly arise between the dominant and the professional significations 
and their signifying agencies’ (Hall, 1980, p. 137). Similarly, we expect differences and even 
conflicts between the professional code and the audience code regarding the same 
hegemonic viewpoints.  
In the case of Mythic Plays, conflicts between the professional code and the 
audience code concern two aspects. On the one hand, viewers’ criticism was directly placed 
on the level of perceived encoding strategies. Viewers criticized a wide range of encoding 
strategies that were adopted to construct patriotic war stories, including but not limited to 
the usage of props, the arrangement of plots, and the characterization of roles. When 
viewers criticized that the props seemed anachronistic, the plots seemed unreasonable, and 
the roles seemed unconvincing, it means that all the signs pieced together in Mythic Plays, 
in their eyes, failed to convey the core meaning of patriotism that can only be conveyed by a 
convincing war story. Therefore, viewers partly based their opposition on what they 
considered inappropriate encoding strategies.  
On the other hand, discordance between different codes generates polysemy, as the 
same sign may have different meanings in different codes. In the case of Mythic Plays, 
producers expected that the elements of commercial TV genres, which were part of their 
encoding strategies, would keep viewers immersed in the stories. However, viewers seemed 
to have decoded these elements in a way that was incongruent with the decoding strategies 
anticipated by the producers. Unexpected by producers, viewers created meanings which 
they deemed disrespectful to the sacred national history. 
For instance, Fight Against the Devils Together has a scene in which a patriotic 
woman visits her jailed lover and invites him to fondle her breasts and crotch. The lover 
pulls a grenade from her pants. They perish together with the enemies. As the script writer 
Shi and the director Zhang explained in an interview, the flirtation of the couple was 
intended to distract the Japanese soldiers, and the vulgar language they used was intended 
to reflect the two patriots’ identities: a bandit and a thief (Liu & Wu, 2015). Shi and Zhang’s 
encoding strategies failed, as this scene became extremely controversial because of its 
sexual elements. News sites drew attention to the scene and many people rushed to review 
sites to give the drama a low rating. One viewer wrote: ‘I admit that I specially watched the 
29th episode [with the grenade scene]!! It created a new genre: resisting-Japan adult 
video!! I see hope for China’s adult video industry!!’ (Douban.com, May 18, 2015). 
Moreover, factors that were not included in the encoding strategies also played a part in the 
decoding process. For example, the actress that played in the grenade scene used to be the 
wife of national hero Liu Xiang, the first Chinese athlete to win an Olympic gold medal in 
track and field. One viewer suggested: ‘That’s why Liu Xiang divorced. He was afraid to be 
bombed’ (Douban.com, Sep 12, 2015). This association between the grenade plot and Liu 
Xiang’s divorce was unlikely to have been expected by Shi and Zhang in their encoding 
process. 
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Our revised encoding/decoding model is able to account for the nuanced dynamics 
between producers and viewers in the case of Mythic Plays (see Figure 2). Based on their 
intended meanings and imagined decoding strategies, which both cater to patriotism, 
producers of Mythic Plays executed certain encoding strategies and gave a certain shape to 
the text. In the decoding process, viewers derived both perceived meanings and perceived 
encoding strategies from the text. From these two dimensions, they arrived at their negative 
evaluation of Mythic Plays. Even though the two sides took the same ideological position, 
the discordance between the professional code and the audience code generated 
unpleasant polysemy and conflicts over encoding strategies, both of which eventually led to 
viewers’ rejection of Mythic Plays. 
 
Reproducing power relations 
Our analysis shows that viewers’ comments on Mythic Plays also reflect their perception of 
the power relations in the media ecology apart from their evaluation of the text. Many 
viewers were aware that censors have the arbitrary power to ban TV shows. Despising 
Mythic Plays, they called for stricter regulation and adopted the official discourse that 
legitimized censorship. Even when viewers doubted regulators’ decisions related to 
resisting-Japan dramas, they did not consider fundamental change to the censorship 
system. 
The online discussion involving Mythic Plays in the first five days of September, 2015, 
when China commemorated the victory against Japan, serves as an example. During this 
period the censorship bureau banned TV programs it deemed mere entertainment. 
Resisting-Japan dramas, war documentaries and other war-themed shows were broadcast. 
Considering the controversy of Mythic Plays, TV channels carefully selected the resisting-
Japan dramas they broadcast (Zeng, 2015). Nevertheless, many viewers seemed to be bored 
with the flood of resisting-Japan dramas, as they still described these dramas as Mythic 
Plays. They doubted the regulators’ decision to let pass a large number of war dramas. 
Some viewers expressed their rejection of the war dramas, but supported the ban on 
entertainment television programs in the name of patriotism. For instance, one viewer 
commented: 
 
#entertainment programs banned for five days# I think the ban is quite good. 
But do these TV channels really have to broadcast Mythic Plays? I think it’s 
good to broadcast interviews or documentaries. I guess in the following five 
days the corpses of Japanese devils will encircle the earth five times. 
(Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015) 
 
Another viewer wrote: 
 
I think the ban is not something bad. There is no reason to be angry with the 
decision to use five days to commemorate those people who made it possible 
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for you to watch TV in a safe world. I only require that no more Mythic Plays 
are broadcast. Broadcast some meaningful documentaries please. 
(Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015)  
 
Although these two viewers situated non-fiction content, mainly the documentaries, in 
positive opposition to resisting-Japan dramas, we should not rush to the conclusion that 
they were objecting to fiction as an inappropriate genre in this context. After all, Mythic 
Plays gained their negative reputation not because they were fictional, but because they 
failed to tell intriguing and convincing stories. On these grounds some viewers distinguished 
the resisting-Japan dramas they liked from Mythic Plays. For instance, one said: ‘There are 
no better resisting-Japan dramas than Drawing Sword (亮剑)! Present-day Mythic Plays 
should learn [from it]! It makes people laugh, but more often it makes people shed tears!’ 
(Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015). Another viewer wrote: ‘I only hope that Mythic Plays are not 
broadcast in these five days when entertainment programs are banned. There are many 
good dramas after all... Battle of Changsha (战长沙)... Warriors Marching Out of Sichuan (壮
士出川)... These can be broadcast’ (Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015). Nevertheless, such comments 
were exceptions. Most viewers indiscriminately rejected all resisting-Japan dramas and 
questioned the ban. Some viewers challenged the censorship bureau’s definition of the 
word ‘entertainment’, arguing that the shown dramas were in fact entertainment: 
 
Entertainment programs are to be banned for five days! Now we watch 
fighting against devils every day! Are you sure those Mythic Plays don’t belong 
to entertainment? Fucking ridiculous! I shall stop talking and start my Zen 
meditation now! (Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015)  
 
Although viewers like this one expressed strong antipathy to resisting-Japan dramas, their 
engagement in the binary discourse of ‘entertainment versus patriotism’ prevented them 
from openly criticizing the ban. Others just voiced their disappointment, using the term 
Mythic Plays to describe the dramas that were nonetheless deemed serious by the 
censorship bureau. One viewer wrote: ‘In recent days Mythic Plays have occupied every 
channel. I’m heartbroken when I turn on the TV’ (Weibo.com, Sep 1, 2015). By referencing 
Mythic Plays, viewers ridiculed the allowed dramas and expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the ban. However, this dissatisfaction did not lead to a deeper reflection on the legitimacy 
of censorship. This was partly due to the fact that entertainment and patriotic education 
were not seen as mutually inclusive, a stance that affirmed the official binary of 
‘entertainment’ and ‘patriotic education’. Though some viewers used the word 
‘entertainment’ as a discursive weapon to argue with the regulators, their understanding of 
the word still functioned to repress symbolic forms that offended official ideology, and to 
legitimate the regulators’ duty of maintaining patriotism. By adopting the discourse of 
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‘entertainment versus patriotism’, viewers contributed to the reproduction of the current 
power relations among censors, producers, and viewers.  
 
Conclusion 
In the online discussions on Mythic Plays Chinese viewers demonstrated their agency in two 
main ways. First, viewers showed they can initiate large-scale online discussions that 
ultimately had an impact on content production. The online discussions not only influenced 
the agenda of state media, but eventually led to a reaction from the censorship bureau, 
which impacted the production of the dramas. Second, viewers showed their power over 
the texts by rejecting the ‘preferred readings’ (Hall, 1980, p. 134) intended by producers. 
Their comments suggest that they did not receive the texts passively. Their criticisms of the 
low qualities of the dramas show their media literacy. 
Nevertheless, the audience’s agency has its limits. Though many researchers 
contend that different groups of viewers create divergent meanings (Fiske, 1986; Morley, 
1980), we saw that viewers’ prominent interpretation of Mythic Plays revolved around 
patriotism. This may be due to the fact that national identity is constructed as an 
overarching category which covers all subgroups in a state. Viewers who flocked online to 
criticize Mythic Plays had already incorporated core ideas and assumptions of patriotism 
promoted by China’s ruling party. In the process of criticizing Mythic Plays, viewers became 
actively complicit with producers and censors in reinforcing those ideas and assumptions. 
The derogatory online comments on Mythic Plays reinforced hegemonic viewpoints, for 
instance by defending the official history. The reactions by state media and censors in 2013 
illustrate that the maintenance of ideology, as Gramsci (2009) posited, results from 
negotiations between the dominant and subordinate forces in society. In this case, the latter 
provided the impetus for a strengthening – not a weakening – of the dominant ideology. 
Viewers who adopted hegemonic discourse may have had a psychological motive of 
which they were perhaps only dimly aware or not at all. Patriotism functioned as a 
discursive weapon with which viewers expressed dislike of and boredom with Mythic Plays 
in ways that were politically acceptable. We would argue that Chinese patriotism functioned 
in a similar way as did ‘the ideology of mass culture’ for certain people who disliked the 
television show Dallas. As Ang has noted:  
 
Apparently the ideology of mass culture has such a monopoly on the judging 
of a phenomenon like Dallas that it supplies ready-made conceptions, as it 
were, which sound self-evident and can be used without any strain or 
hesitation. The dominance of the ideology of mass culture apparently even 
extends to the common sense of everyday thinking: for ordinary people too it 
appears to offer a credible framework of interpretation for judging cultural 
forms like Dallas. (Ang, 1985, p. 95) 
 
Almost automatically, then, some online commenters expressed their genuine dislike of 
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Mythic Plays in the language that they grew up with, still encounter every day, and 
therefore is most readily available to them: the language of Chinese patriotism. 
Viewers went further than judging whether certain shows were patriotic or not. They 
also urged censors to react to Mythic Plays. Given the current power structure in China’s 
media ecology, viewers perceived censorship as a weapon useful for wiping out what they 
disliked. They ignored China’s strict censorship as a cause for the shows lacking in quality 
and creativity, and for the lack of diversity in the cultural industry. Moreover, they seemed 
to have neglected that they were the ones to be shepherded by censors as well. On the one 
hand, they constructed an active self-identity, trying to demonstrate that they themselves 
were free from the influence of the cheesy products of commercial culture. On the other 
hand, they often adopted a paternalistic attitude towards other viewers, especially 
teenagers. The lack of faith they exhibited in others’ ability to self-govern positioned them 
as allies of authoritarianism and supporters of censorship. Accordingly, they gave pointers to 
the censors to do a more acceptable job, castigated the producers and directors of Mythic 
Plays for being irresponsible, and expressed concern for the well-being of youngsters 
watching Mythic Plays. Ironically, all this free online labor in service of hegemony, and 
arguably against the audience’s own interest, did not affect the state media’s stereotypical 
discourse on the audience. They continued to depict the audience as a passive, monolithic 
entity that requires guidance. For had not its lack of taste encouraged the production of 
Mythic Plays? 
In light of our study we introduce two contributions to audience research. First, we 
propose a revision to Hall’s encoding/decoding model, which allows researchers to capture 
more nuances in the producer-viewer dynamics by considering the diversity of producers’ 
ideological positions, polysemy generated by the differences between the professional code 
and the audience code, and viewers’ awareness of the ‘constructedness’ of the text. 
Specifically, we posit that rejecting the preferred readings intended by content producers is 
not by definition the same as resisting dominant ideology. Audience researchers cannot 
simply assume that media workers are all skilled encoders and always encode messages in 
conformity with the code that is widely accepted by the audience. Even when the producers 
and the audience take the same ideological position, conflicts over the codes can lead to the 
audience’s opposition to the text. In the case of Mythic Plays, the professional code 
conflicted with the audience code. Viewers held the view that producers failed to encode 
programs in accordance with the dominant ideology. Therefore, we suggest that researchers 
conceptually separate two distinct dimensions in the audience’s decoding process. One is 
the perceived meaning of the text, which is linked to the different positions the audience 
takes with regard to the hegemonic viewpoint, as discussed in the encoding/decoding 
model of Hall (1980). The other is the perceived encoding strategies, which are associated 
with the audience’ evaluation of the professional code, or how professionals use certain 
signs to convey certain meanings. Future research may focus more on how the latter 
process unfolds and interacts with the former. 
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Our second theoretical contribution concerns viewers’ perception of their position of 
power in the circuit of culture. To our knowledge this issue has not yet been discussed in 
audience studies. Nonetheless, we think it needs to be taken into account in any analysis, 
for the audience’s reflections on media consumption involve not only the interpretation of 
content but also a consideration of the power relations among the main actors in the 
culture industries, including producers, regulators, and audience members. In this sense, 
audience research should not only examine how the audience interacts with the dominant 
ideology, but also scrutinize how the audience deals with the power structure in media 
production. 
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Notes: 
                                                          
1 See: http://tieba.baidu.com/p/2828024334  consulted on October 13, 2015. 
2 To protect the privacy of the online commenters we do not provide links to the original texts. 
3 In 2017 China’s government ordered that all Chinese history textbooks be rewritten to extend the 
second Sino-Japanese war by six years. See: 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jan/13/china-rewrites-history-books-to-extend-sino-
japanese-war-by-six-years consulted on February 7, 2017. 
4 An online survey by newspaper China Youth Daily confirms many of our judgments about prevalent 
opinions towards Mythic Plays. Sixty-one percent of about 2,000 people surveyed said Mythic Plays 
focus too much on providing entertainment; almost half blamed commercial needs. Close to 40 
percent called Mythic Plays vulgar and cheesy and almost half worry that Mythic Plays give 
teenagers a wrong impression of history. Three out of four surveyed held the censorship bureau 
primarily responsible for the Mythic Plays. Seven in ten also held the producers responsible and 
almost three out of ten also blamed the broadcasters. The survey should be interpreted cautiously. 
The survey should be interpreted cautiously. One of its shortcomings is that the questions and 
answer options were formulated by the newspaper. For instance, the survey did not allow people to 
blame the central government or the CCP for Mythic Plays. In contrast, our research is grounded in 
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people’s discursive environment. We examined viewers’ spontaneous discourse and could pay 
attention to opinions that cannot be expressed in state media like China Youth Daily. See: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-08/31/c_128182392.htm consulted on December 4, 
2018. 
